How incapable we are in our reflections, our deliberations upon the possible nature of the text that we still cling to the possibility of objective readings and absolute meaning. How weak are we in our own search of a imagined stability that we cannot accept a world without a hardness to it which thwarts all and any feasibility of fluidity, contradiction or admissibility of different forms of thought. We never seem to cease our endless quest for proof that the world we inhabit is stable and whole or can be made so through enough philosophical effort. What can even be the goal of such a practice apart from a possible emotional satisfaction, which although completely valid in all its forms is possible without the citation and proclamation of past conceptions and philosophical traditions? If we truly wish to perform an askesis as Michel Foucault would put it, an exercise of the self in which we attempt to think otherwise from the dogmatic philosophical axioms of logic and rationality we must attempt a madman's approach. The constraints that are the base upon which superstructures of ideology and critical thought are built upon must be, if not torn down which could present to great a leap of (shall we maybe ironically put it) faith for the academy, but re-examined. The text itself in all its forms is both an object of oppression, an oppressor in itself and a discursive line, limit that in its creation through the reading, re-reading and interpretation is used to harden the lines of what could possibly be our existence or even our inner text in which we find a hope of an authentic self. The redefinition of the text is one that has been and needs be done more if we desire a deconstruction of what can be the truth that we must live and adhere to, which lays pressure upon our bodies both from the outside and the inside, through the suffocation that exists in the technologies of the self, that do not allow us to breathe if not in line with the normative world.

As philosopher and feminist writer Donna Haraway analysed both in her book and the Cyborg Manifesto, our bodies are not just purely natural, given to the world and free from technological and human creation in their existence. Our bodies our not just human either, not simply existing as such in the world but a cyborg, a chimera of unnatural parts and objects which constitute our existence and the physical, discursive and ideological ways are bodies can exist in. As a possible note of self criticism, we might be right in rejecting the also oppressive axioms of material and spiritual, ideological and physical, for the line between should not be so clear, they are also deeply constructed, as well as deeply western, dichotomies that might also prevent us from the reflection needed to deconstruct our reality and construct if not a new or different one, which might not be even the finest solution, but notion of the relativity of the given, of what 'is' and what 'must be'. The tale we so readily all tell ourselves, that we with the advent of the enlightenment, the new age of logic, of free thought (how ridiculous and prideful of a concept ironically much in line in its flavour with the one preceding it) no longer weighed down by the chains of dogma, especially the dogma of religion, of the Church as an institution we are no longer in danger of oppressive regimes and discourses that force upon knowledge and thought which is absurd, but now force upon knowledge and thought which is logical. We have preformed an apotheosis of these concepts (during the French bourgeois revolution quite literally) and we are as limited by them and their wholeness as we are by religion, however we now have systems of proof constructed and inscribed into the discourse that prove our absurd beliefs.

Even the greatest reductionists of societal influence or authorial intent admit that a text is filled with meaning, the symbols that make it up hold some meaning in them (or conversely they are once registered in our minds something we inscribe meaning to in compliance with the norms of our language, culture, gender, class etc.) which is interpreted, understood in some form whether it be in line with the discourse or not. However, all readings can only ever be misreadings. The text itself never truly holds an objective or absolute meaning, not even in the intent of the Author or Discourse (quite the postmodern form of Spinosa's Deus sive Natura) for these points are in themselves fluid and ever changing. The text is never a given, it is a process of inscription upon a physical, digital or otherwise ephemeral body of narrative. What lies beneath all the layers of 'faulty' readings is no authentic self but such a hard discursive pressure to accept even one form of reality as absolute,

even if it must be purely linguistic. However, even if we perform readings that are in their maximum possibility 'correct' and normatively acceptable, we still cannot escape the misreading. For the normativity of this world, however hard, is still too fluid to be absolute, leaving our bodies in the space between an idea of freedom and the rules of the discourse. We as subjects and objects in the world, however perfect our performativity may be as Judith Butler might have put it, still cannot reach the ideal, whichever it may be; the gender ideal, the national, the academic, philosophical. We are all discursively nothing but failed attempts at reaching constructed identities with different amounts of power and agency bestowed upon us by the discourse.

All readings are simultaneously re-readings, interpretations and understandings based on previous readings and knowledge. The accumulated mass of our entire life experience, the habitus as Pierre Bourdieu would have called it, is the only instrument through which we can not only observe or interpret the world, but exist and act in it, perform an identity and the exercise of learning. What we wish to forcefully disengage from our experience, from the perceived faultiness of our subjective perception is what we might call a finality, an original, an objective text that, however some positivists might wish for it, does not seem to be possible. History itself gives too many examples of which we are ashamed to admit were dominant forms of thought, which then were the outmost rational conceptions and now are viewed as so different from ours, so immoral and terrifying in our current perception. However, they are present in the historical text, of whose validity we also cannot absolutely know but such a thesis even more points to the postmodern rejection of historical metanarratives and conceptualisation of history as a constant construction of the past in the present day which goes even less in line with positivist sensibilities. The objectivity we imagine (and so rarely define yet use as a intuitively understandable axiom) and the text which is constructed through the belief in this objectivity can only lead to a misreading and re-reading through the lens of our experience and habitus.

Furthermore, our ability of rationality, of thinking in certain forms and patterns which are in the tradition of the humanistic disciplines recognised as logic, and of understanding a text are limited, for these constructed patterns of thought leave little possibility to adapt, to fluidly change course and achieve a new perspective on questions we are currently incapable of adequately answering. Why do we still fall into the foolhardy attempts of proving our ratio, our mind, the western tradition of logic can reach the absolute? This may stay in line with certain aspects of the discourse but even it, in all its 'godly might' allows a possibility of change for there are not so few examples of principles of pure antirationality present, admittedly the neo-liberal postmodern discourse is the space of the greatest contradictions. The absolute essentialisation and dogmatic adherence to these concepts represented by logic and objectivity which allow us to find out the third undefinable and constructed concept of truth, seem even then to provide only a partial reading (as they appear to always do), never complete. We seem to in our hubris forever wish to achieve a state of complete and limitless possibility in the quest for knowledge, yet we only through these attempts seem to circularly return to the same point in philosophical history.

However the text is through all these ways, in its own creation, consumption and recreation, which are all organically connected practices when engaging with a text, unreachable in its originality for all the faultiness of our perception, our utilisation of rationality, of our experience and the dynamic and processual nature of the text. However, maybe what truly erases or more precisely never even allows the creation of an original text, of its original meaning is the discourse itself. The text cannot exist without a reading in some form, for it is then not even recognised as text, does not provide meaning or allows itself to be inscribed with meaning, and there can be no readings which are not in some shape or form imposed. All readings are imposed through systems of power and domination, the discourse which exists not just inside or outside the space of the text, but in the process of reading itself, in the technologies of the self when the reading of a certain text is constantly a form

of accepting or queering the power of the discourse. The possible performativity of both linguistic and semiotic understanding of a text is continually under the pressure of existing meanings, interpretations, cultures, schools of thought as well as normative rules and suggestions on what is desirable to be thought. We are so un-free in our textual processing that both the loss and construction of the authentic self is done through the discursive machinations of power. When we construct the 'I' that both reads and simultaneously interprets the text performs a citation of the limits of the society which we are a part and product of, as well as the oppressive systems and superstructures that influence that which is the substance of reality. The text is key to the self in this context which is one other point so important in Haraway's philosophy, which is the selfhood that we construct and live in is inescapable and constantly under oppressive measures from both norms and rules, as well as more worldly structures such as cultures, states, laws, police etc. An exercise in which we search for a possible space, one which is gueered, which not only rejects the propagated text but accepts and created an imagined one, which is equally as valid in its construction as any other. The cyborg is a hopeful sign, a possibility of the de-essentialised world in which our bodies are no longer constrained by the discursive dogma of all their known possibilities. Much the same can be said for knowledge or thought, all the further attempts into philosophical query.

Finally, most every reading is an imagined reading by which Haraway does not mean a psychotic break form the discursively perceived reality (however plausible such an interpretation with enough nuance might be), but a construction of what the text is and the modality of what it could in the past and future be. We are 'sane' in these fantasies for they position our minds and bodies which read the text, in line and in the doxic experience of reality. The text is a space of conflict and struggle, between the different practices and ideologies, forms of thought as well as propagated meanings it is never simply a given, never truly spacially or temporally present without the process of its creation through the reading which is nothing more than a discursive struggle for power over the definition of reality, of the world that was never truly whole, now fallen apart, in what or, maybe even better, whose image shall this world be (re)constructed. The text and the world exist in the reading, the interpretation, whether it be a combination of the personal, societal, mythological, dogmatical or other, they only exist in these process which wish to define the self and the space and time in which the self is present. Our fanciful wish for a stable narrative is an unreachable one, at least in our current definition of stability. However, there is hope in the fact of this instability, of the oppressive hand of the neo-liberal capitalist discourse not achieving complete domination as of yet. In this fluidity, of a not yet constructed world we have contending and clashing possibilities for a different existence, one possibly much less normative and constrictive not just within the physical body, but the conception of the mind and what it presents. The conflict between different ideologies and conceptualisations of the world is never an apolitical one, much to the contrary it is a deeply political conflict and it is one that may not be possible to resolve non-violently or possibly at all. Conversely this state of imbalance allows for the creation of queered spaces, places of freedom from the Panopticon, as Foucault defined them heterotopias. These places so non-normative in their very existence yet very consistent with the cultural logic of postmodernism and neo-liberalism. Such places do not only provide a possibility for the new lives of cyborgs, but a creation of a new discursive logic. A heterotopia is a rejection of the utopia, of the philosophical tradition and logic behind it, however it is not an anti-utopia, it does not go into nihilistic or deterministic statements about human nature (postmodernism at large and Foucault especially rejected the possibility of the existence of a determined human nature). Heterotopias are spaces where very differentiated subdiscourses and great contradictions inside the discourse meet and interact, finally combining with each other creating a new queered space. Such a space gives hope for the cyborg and its acceptance, for the redefinition of the text and the way it is read and for all oppressed and marginalized subjects within the discourse, and if not hope then the freedom from the pressure upon the bodies and selfhoods which we create.